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Abstract. - The promise of punishment and reward in promoting public cooperation is debatable.
While punishment is traditionally considered more successful than reward, the fact that the cost of
punishment frequently fails to offset gains from enhanced cooperation has lead some to reconsider
reward as the main catalyst behind collaborative efforts. Here we elaborate on the “stick versus
carrot” dilemma by studying the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, where
besides the traditional cooperators and defectors, rewarding cooperators supplement the array of
possible strategies. The latter are willing to reward cooperative actions at a personal cost, thus
effectively downgrading pure cooperators to second-order free-riders due to their unwillingness
to bear these additional costs. Consequently, we find that defection remains viable, especially if
the rewarding is costly. Rewards, however, can promote cooperation, especially if the synergetic
effects of cooperation are low. Surprisingly, moderate rewards may promote cooperation better
than high rewards, which is due to the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance between the
three strategies.
Introduction. – Sustainable development and intact
social stability require collaborative efforts. Although self-
ishness and competitiveness are an inherent part of hu-
man nature, field studies and experiments attest to the
fact that humans are willing to cooperate if the conditions
are right [1]. Failure to do so results in the exploitation
of public goods, such as environmental resources or social
benefits, by defectors, who in doing so reap benefits on the
expense of cooperators. The “tragedy of the commons”
succinctly describes such a situation [2]. In pairwise in-
teractions reciprocation can work in favor of cooperation
[3–5]. If more than two persons are involved, however, to
reciprocate becomes challenging and the burden of sus-
taining cooperation often falls on punishment [6–9], as
reviewed comprehensively in [10]. The Achilles’ heel of
punishment is the fact that it is costly, and it is therefore
not clear how it emerges and how to stabilize it. Those
that contribute to the common good but abstain from pun-
ishing wrongdoers are “second-order free-riders”, who, in
the absence of additional incentives aimed at sustaining
punishment, prevail and thus eliminate the threat of sanc-
tioning [11–13]. For this unfortunate scenario to unravel,
it has recently been suggested that punishment should be
a coordinated act [14]. It has also been shown that the
network reciprocity in structured populations alone may
be sufficient to solve the second-order free-rider problem
[15, 16], and pool-punishment has been considered as an
alternative to the traditionally employed peer-punishment
with remarkable success [17]. Nevertheless, studies criti-
cally probing the effectiveness of punishment in sustaining
cooperation, for example in conjunction with anti-social
punishment [18], indirect reciprocity [19], or unfair sanc-
tions [20], are an important reminder of open questions
still imbuing the subject.
Reward is an established alternative to punishment
[21, 22], albeit studied less frequently in the past. While
punishment implies paying a cost for another person to
incur a cost, rewards obviously incorporate a cost to bear
too, but for another person to experience a benefit. The
majority of previous studies addressing the “stick versus
carrot” dilemma concluded that punishment is more ef-
fective than reward in sustaining public cooperation [10].
But as pointed out in a recent paper by Rand et al. [23],
most of these studies disregarded future consequences for
today’s actions. Indeed, reputation is key [24] and repre-
sents a precious asset to loose over an act of punishment
that may or may not help in reverting the punished in-
dividual. Rewarding is in this respect a safer alternative,
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and as concluded in [23], may be as effective as punishment
for maintaining public cooperation. Inspired by these ex-
perimental findings, we here investigate the impact of re-
ward on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial pub-
lic goods game by means of an additional third strategy.
The so-called rewarding cooperators, i.e. cooperators that
reward other cooperators, are willing to bear additional
costs in order to reward those that contribute to the com-
mon good. As by the introduction of costly punishment,
the traditional cooperators, i.e. those that contribute to
the common good but do not reward other cooperators,
become second-order free-riders that fiercely challenge the
proliferation of rewarding cooperators. We come to inter-
esting and partly counterintuitive conclusions that go well
with existing studies on punishment in structured popu-
lations [15, 16, 25, 26], as well as supplement the array of
other mechanisms, such as voluntary participation [27],
social [28] and group [29] diversity, random exploration
of strategies [30], or similar additions [31–34], that can
be associated with the promotion of cooperation in public
goods games.
Public goods game with reward. – The public
goods game is staged on a square lattice with periodic
boundary conditions, whereon initially each player on site
x is designated either as a cooperator (sx = C), defector
(sx = D), or rewarding cooperator (sx = RC), with equal
probability. Players play the game with their k = 4 neigh-
bors. Accordingly, each individual belongs to five different
groups, i.e. it is the focal individual of a Moore neighbor-
hood and a member of the Moore neighborhood of its four
nearest neighbors.
Using standard parametrization, the two cooperating
strategies (C and RC) contribute 1 to the public good
while defectors contribute nothing. The sum of all con-
tributions is multiplied by the factor r > 1, reflecting the
synergetic effects of cooperation, and the resulting amount
is subsequently equally shared among the k + 1 interact-
ing individuals irrespective of their strategies. In addi-
tion, here each cooperator (C and RC) receives the reward
β/k from every rewarding cooperator that is a member of
the focal group, and every rewarding cooperator from this
group therefore bears an additional cost γ/k, thus leading
to different payoffs of Cs and RCs. Denoting the number
of Cs, Ds, and RCs among the k interaction partners by
NC, ND, and NRC, respectively, each cooperator gets
PC = r(NC +NRC + 1)/(k + 1)− 1 + β(NRC)/k , (1)
a defector receives
PD = r(NC +NRC)/(k + 1) , (2)
while every rewarding cooperator acquires
PRC = PC − γ(NC +NRC)/k . (3)
It is worth pointing out that the cost γ and reward β
are not necessarily identical. This is easy to justify with
realistic examples. To praise someone hardly costs any-
thing, yet it may do wonders for the recipient. On the
other hand, an affectionate spouse can spend a small for-
tune on a dress for the partner, only to be later ridiculed
for bad taste. While not necessarily representative, we
believe these two simple examples suffice to justify the
introduction of two rather than a single parameter in or-
der to examine the impact of reward thoroughly, with all
its subtleties. We also point out that β and γ are intro-
duced normalized with the number of neighboring players
k in each group in order to facilitate comparisons with
results obtained on other interaction graphs or by using
differently sized groups. Moreover, the values of β and
γ then represent maximally attainable values within each
group and the setup is directly comparable with the pre-
viously studied punishment model [15]. As was reported
in [16,35], here it holds too that the presented results are
robust to reasonable variations of the underlying network
structure and group size.
After the three strategies on the L2 square lattice are
distributed uniformly at random, a random sequential up-
date with the following elementary steps is performed.
First, a randomly selected player x plays the public goods
game with the k interaction partners of a group g, and
obtains a payoff P g
x
from all k + 1 = 5 groups it belongs
to. The overall payoff is thus Px =
∑
g
P g
x
. Next, one of
the four nearest neighbors of player x is chosen randomly,
and its location is denoted by y. Player y also acquires
its payoff Py identically as previously player x. Finally,
player y imitates the strategy of player x with the proba-
bility q = 1/{1+ exp[(Py −Px)/K]}, where K determines
the level of uncertainty by strategy adoptions [36]. With-
out the loss of generality we set K = 0.5, implying that
better performing players are readily imitated, but it is
not impossible to adopt the strategy of a player perform-
ing worse. Such errors in judgment can be attributed to
mistakes and external influences that affect the evaluation
of the opponent. Each full Monte Carlo step involves all
players having a chance to adopt a strategy from one of
their neighbors once on average. Depending on the typi-
cal size of emerging spatial patterns, the linear system size
was varied from L = 400 − 5000 in order to avoid finite
size effects, and the equilibration required up to 107 full
Monte Carlo steps (MCS).
Results. – In the absence of reward, cooperators sur-
vive only if r > 3.74 and crowd out defectors completely
for r > 5.49 if using the square lattice as the interac-
tion graph [35]. These can be used as benchmark values
for evaluating the impact of reward on the evolution of
cooperation in structured populations. Accordingly, we
will focus on three different values of the synergy factor
r, namely 2.0, 3.5 and 4.4, being representative for low,
intermediate and high synergetic effects of cooperation,
respectively. Hereafter, we will thus systematically exam-
ine how different combinations of reward (the benefit the
recipient experiences upon being rewarded) β and cost (of
p-2
Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game
 0.0
 
 0.1
 
 0.2
 0   0.5   1   1.5
co
st
  [
 
γ ]
reward  [ β ]
D
(D+RC)
(RC)
D+C+RC
C+RC
(a)
 0.0
 
 
 
 0.2
 
 
 
 0.4
 
 
 
 0.6
 
 
 
 0.8
 
 
 
 1.0
 0.7   0.8   0.9   1
fra
ct
io
ns
reward  [ β ]
ρC
ρD
ρRC
(b)
Fig. 1: (a) Full reward-cost phase diagram obtained for the
synergy factor r = 2.0. Different phases are denoted by the
symbols of the strategies that survive in the final strategy dis-
tribution. Solid blue lines indicate continuous phase transi-
tions. A typical cross-section of the phase diagram at the cost
γ = 0.01 is shown in panel (b), depicting the fraction of co-
operators ρC, defectors ρD and rewarding cooperators ρRC in
dependence on the reward β.
giving the reward) γ affect the survivability of the three
strategies on the square lattice.
We start with the low r limit, thus setting r = 2.0.
Figure 1(a) features the full reward-cost phase diagram,
where it can be observed that the pure D phase first gives
way to a very narrow region of coexistence of D+RC and
shortly thereafter reaches the pure RC phase as the reward
increases. The blue transition lines, indicating continu-
ous second-order phase transitions, lean towards higher
rewards for larger costs, yet this effect is expected and val-
idates the behavior of the examined model. Most remark-
able is the reappearance of defectors in a stable D+C+RC
phase if the reward is increased further, thus giving rise to
a stable coexistence of all three strategies. Finally, if the
reward is higher still and the costs remain moderate (note
that the slope of the rightmost transition line is consider-
ably larger), defectors again die out and leave C and RC
as the only remaining strategies. Notably, here C and RC
are not equivalent strategies as was the case in a recently
studied punishment model [15, 16], and thus their stable
coexistence is possible.
Turning to the reappearance of defectors for intermedi-
ate rewards, we show in Fig. 1(b) a characteristic cross-
section of the phase diagram obtained for γ = 0.01. In
agreement with the four blue lines depicted in Fig. 1(a),
a b c d
Fig. 2: Characteristic snapshots of a 100 × 100 square lattice
with specially prepared initial conditions (see main text for
details). Colors red, green and blue depict the location of de-
fectors (D), rewarding cooperators (RC) and cooperators (C),
respectively. The snapshots were taken at 0 (a), 140 (b), 560 (c)
and 600 (d) full MCS, and the parameter values were r = 2.0,
γ = 0.05 and β = 0.9.
we can observe four continuous phase transitions. From
left to right we have, first, the emergence of rewarding
cooperators (ρRC > 0), which is quickly followed by the
extinction of defectors (ρD = 0). Subsequently, defectors
(D) reaper with pure cooperators (C) to form the coexis-
tence of all three strategies, and finally, at β ≈ 0.873 de-
fectors die out again. Interpreting these observations, for
sufficiently large β the rewarding cooperators can support
each other and protect themselves against the invasion
of defectors. In accordance with the well-known network
reciprocity mechanism, rewarding cooperators aggregate
into compact clusters with a smooth interface (not shown
here). At still higher β, the efficiency of rewarding cooper-
ators is so strong that defectors cannot survive. Remark-
ably, for β > 0.775 the support of cooperative actions be-
comes powerful enough to enable not just the proliferation
of rewarding cooperators (RC), but also the survivability
of pure cooperators (C). But since the synergy factor is
low (r=2.0), the pure cooperators are susceptible to ex-
ploitation by defectors and can therefore survive only in
the vicinity of rewarding cooperators. Nevertheless, the
emergence of pure cooperators simultaneously enables also
the survivability of defectors via a stable D+C+RC phase
that is governed by cyclic dominance.
The workings of this cyclic dominance can be demon-
strated by examining the snapshots of strategy distribu-
tions. Figure 2(a) depicts a prepared initial state, where-
after the movements of the boundaries that separate the
three strategies give vital insight into the dominance be-
tween them. Due to the small synergy factor r, the de-
fectors (red) can easily invade the blue region of pure co-
operators. Simultaneously, since the reward is large, re-
warding cooperators (green) can outperform defectors. In
the midst of rewarding cooperators, however, pure coop-
erators (blue) can spread as well because they enjoy the
significant benefits of reward but do not bear any costs.
But as soon as some of the pure cooperators depart from
the safe haven of rewarding cooperators, the whole circle
of invasion starts anew, leading to an uprise of defectors
(red), who are then again conquered by rewarding coop-
erators, who then again foster the spreading of pure coop-
erators, and so on. Clearly thus, the three strategies form
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a closed loop of dominance, which can be observed nicely
if following the snapshots presented in Fig. 2 from left to
right (qualitatively identical spatial patterns emerge from
random initial conditions if the system size is sufficiently
large). It is worth emphasizing that if one of the three
strategies dies out by chance due to a small system size,
the balance within the closed loop of dominance is bro-
ken, and accordingly, one of the remaining two strategies
spreads across the whole grid. To avoid this, it is therefore
paramount to use sufficiently large system sizes. Interest-
ingly, the stationary density of defectors is considerable,
but the increase of the ρD(β) function is the more dra-
matic the larger the cost of reward γ. This is in agreement
with the behavior of predator-prey systems where the di-
rect support of prey will ultimately be beneficial for the
predators. Naturally, if the reward β is even larger, defec-
tors cannot survive and the system arrives to the mixed
C+RC phase, as depicted in Figs. 1(a) and (b). Note
that the qualitative behavior thereafter does not change
and the fraction of cooperators and rewarding cooperators
converges to a nonzero value. This, however, is a unique
consequence of the spatial structure since in well-mixed
populations cooperators (C), i.e. second-order free-riders,
clearly perform better than rewarding cooperators (RC)
and should thus become dominant. In fact, the mechanism
that allows rewarding cooperators to survive in the sea of
second-order free-riders is identical to the one revealed by
Nowak and May when studying the two-strategy spatial
prisoner’s dilemma game on the square lattice [37]. In our
case RCs also form compact clusters that allow them to
survive the competition with the superior pure coopera-
tors.
To explore the robustness of our observations obtained
for the small synergy factor r = 2.0, we study the evolu-
tion of cooperation also for the intermediate value r = 3.5,
although this still results in a pure D phase in the ab-
sence of reward [35]. From the reward-cost phase dia-
gram presented in Fig. 3(a) it follows that the qualitative
features, if compared to Fig. 1(a), remain largely intact.
The most significant change is the expansion of the mixed
D+RC phase, ultimately leading to the disappearance of
the pure RC phase. Note that the stable coexistence of
RCs in the sea of Ds is, similarly as the C+RC phase,
due to spatial reciprocity [37], allowing the inferior strat-
egy (as obtained for well-mixed populations) to survive by
means of clustering. On the other hand, the coexistence
phase containing all three strategies, along with the cyclic
dominance between them, is fully preserved. In fact, the
D+C+RC region is expanded too, which is further coun-
terintuitive in view of the larger synergy factor used. The
latter, of course, promotes cooperation, and should thus
act detrimental rather than positive on the survivability
of defectors.
Figure 3(b) supports this surprising outcome from a
quantitative perspective. Indeed, the uprise of defectors,
going up to ρD ∼= 0.19, is significantly stronger than what
was observed for r = 2.0 in Fig. 1(b). The reason for this,
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Fig. 3: (a) Full reward-cost phase diagram obtained for the
synergy factor r = 3.5 (phases are denoted by the symbols of
surviving strategies). Solid blue lines indicate continuous phase
transitions. A typical cross-section of the phase diagram at the
cost γ = 0.05 is shown in panel (b), depicting the fraction of
cooperators ρC, defectors ρD and rewarding cooperators ρRC
in dependence on the reward β.
we argue, is the fact that larger values of r support both,
the rewarding as well as pure cooperators. The larger
abundance of pure cooperators in particular, gives the de-
fectors more opportunities to conquer lost ground from
rewarding cooperators. Note that in the absence of re-
ward r = 3.5 still fails to sustain cooperative behavior.
Accordingly, the strength of dominance within the closed
D → C → RC → D loop unexpectedly shifts in favor of
defectors, which is again an exemplification of how the
support of prey ultimately benefits the predator. Fur-
thermore, although not surprisingly, it can be observed
that the transition lines in Fig. 3(a) and the correspond-
ing phase transitions in Fig. 3(b) are altogether shifted to
significantly lower values of β, which is expected since the
synergy factor alone provides a better support for the two
cooperative strategies. The emergence of rewarding co-
operators, and subsequently also of pure cooperators and
defectors by means of cyclic dominance, can thus be war-
ranted already by substantially lower rewards.
Lastly, we examine the impact of reward on the evolu-
tion of cooperation at a high synergy factor, thus setting
r = 4.4. The reward-cost phase diagram is presented in
Fig. 4(a). It differs considerably from the previous two,
predominantly due to the fact that cooperators can, at
this values of r, be sustained by network reciprocity alone.
Accordingly, the pure D phase is missing and the ρD(β)
p-4
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Fig. 4: (a) Full reward-cost phase diagram obtained for the
synergy factor r = 4.4 (phases are denoted by the symbols
of surviving strategies). Solid blue (dotted red) lines indicate
continuous (discontinuous) phase transitions. A typical cross-
section of the phase diagram at the cost γ = 0.01 is shown in
panel (b), depicting the fraction of cooperators ρC, defectors
ρD and rewarding cooperators ρRC in dependence on β.
function is monotonously decreasing, as can be observed
from Fig. 4(b). The existence of the three-strategy phase
is also constrained to a significantly smaller portion of
the β − γ parameter plane. Substantial benefits of col-
laborative efforts thus work clearly in favor of the two
cooperative strategies, which become the main aspirants
for supremacy on the spatial grid. The perseverance of
defectors, going extinct only if β > 0.58, is nevertheless
remarkable.
Results presented in Fig. 4(b) allow for an accurate ex-
amination of the competition between pure (C) and re-
warding (RC) cooperators. Unlike for small and inter-
mediate values of r, we can here observe a discontinuous
phase transition [marked dotted red in Fig. 4(a)], by means
of which rewarding cooperators first outperform pure co-
operators. The mechanism behind this transition is iden-
tical to the one reported recently in the context of pun-
ishment in structured populations [15], and can be sum-
marized by an indirect territorial battle as follows. Pure
and rewarding cooperators form homogeneous isolated is-
lands on the spatial grid and fight independently against
the defectors. If the reward is high enough the rewarding
cooperators will be more successful in this than pure coop-
erators, and accordingly will have an evolutionary advan-
tage in the stationary state. Conversely, for less favorable
reward conditions, i.e. if β becomes comparable to γ, pure
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Fig. 5: Time evolution of strategy densities as obtained for
r = 4.4, γ = 0.001, β = 0.003 (a) and β = 0.004 (b). The
fraction of defectors is plotted solid red, while the fractions of
pure and rewarding cooperators are depicted by dotted blue
and dashed green lines, respectively. Note the opposite time
evolution of the two cooperative strategies that is induced by a
minute change in the hight of the reward β, taking the system
from one side of a discontinuous phase transition to the other.
cooperators will be more successful in gaining ground from
defectors, and accordingly, they will prevail.
These two different evolutionary scenarios can be illus-
trated nicely by comparing the time courses of strategy
densities for two different values of the reward, at one and
the other side of the transition line, respectively. As Fig. 5
shows, the fraction of defectors becomes time-independent
after a short transient and indeed depends only on the
value of r. The indirect battle between pure and reward-
ing cooperators starts thereafter and the fractions of these
two strategies will change oppositely depending on β. If
the reward is low, as shown in Fig. 5(a), pure coopera-
tors outperform defectors more efficiently and hence crowd
out also the rewarding cooperators. At the other side
of the discontinuous phase transition point, for a slightly
higher value of β, as shown in Fig. 5(b), the opposite sce-
nario unfolds, and the system will eventually evolve to a
D+RC phase. Concluding the study, it can be noted from
Fig. 4(b) that as the reward increases further the second-
order free-riders gradually better the rewarding coopera-
tors, for the former enjoy the benefits of reward without
participating in sharing the costs. As defectors die out
completely the balance shifts again in favor of rewarding
cooperators by means of the same mechanism that we out-
lined when described the results presented in Figs 1(b) and
3(b).
Summary. – We have investigated the impact of re-
ward on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public
goods game. Using the square lattice as the underlying in-
teraction network, we found that costly rewards facilitate
cooperation most effectively if the synergetic effects of co-
operation are low. Surprisingly though, high rewards may
be less effective in promoting cooperation than moderate
p-5
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rewards. The intricate patterns of cooperation were exam-
ined systematically by means of phase diagrams, where a
succession of discontinuous and continuous phase transi-
tions was found separating the stable coexistence of dif-
ferent strategies. Depending on the synergy factor and
the details of rewarding, we have demonstrated the sta-
ble coexistence of all possible combinations of the three
strategies. The counterintuitive impact of high rewards in
particular, was attributed to the spontaneous emergence
of cyclic dominance between the three strategies, which
can be molded further by predator-prey-like interactions
at intermediate synergy factors. Due to the second-order
free-riding role of traditional cooperators who refuse to
bear the costs of rewarding, however, it is impossible to
conclude that rewards in structured populations render
defection maladaptive. Indeed, defection remains viable
in considerably large regions of the parameter space, yet
even for very low synergy factors, properly tuned rewards
can support cooperation where otherwise defection would
reign completely. Compared to costly punishment, how-
ever, the promotion of cooperation by means of costly re-
wards seems altogether less efficient. Note that in the
absence of defectors the punishing cooperators become
equivalent to the cooperators, while rewarding cooperators
still keep paying the cost of reward and therefore remain
inferior to the second-order free-riders. Thus, for reward
to work equally well as punishment, the ratio between the
benefit and the cost of rewarding must be significantly
higher than in case of punishment (cf. [15]). At high syn-
ergy factors, on the other hand, the network reciprocity
alone suffices to decimate the defectors, and the impact of
reward is then restricted to establishing the victor between
traditional cooperators and rewarding cooperators only.
The two duel each other by means of an indirect territo-
rial battle against defectors, where the winning strategy
is the one that is more effective in eliminating defectors.
If the rewarding is costly the winners are the traditional
cooperators, but if the benefits of reward offset its costs by
a comfortable margin then the victors are the rewarding
cooperators. The border between these two outcomes is a
discontinuous phase transition. In sum, the rich plethora
of stable pure and mixed phases as well as intriguing dy-
namical processes that govern the evolution in the pres-
ence of rewarding clearly point to the complexity of pos-
sible solutions in structured populations and strengthen
their prominent role in the pursuit of cooperation.
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